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General Winfield Scott, a veteran of the War of 1812, helped to mediate the con-
flict between Maine and New Brunswick over the Aroostook territory in early
1839. Scott’s mediation eased tensions on both sides of the disputed border, and
bloodshed was averted. Maine Historical Society Collections. 
“MAINE AND HER SOIL, OR BLOOD!”: 
POLITICAL RHETORIC AND SPATIAL
IDENTITY DURING THE AROOSTOOK
WAR IN MAINE
BY MICHAEL T. PERRY
The Aroostook War was a two-month standoff during the winter of 1839
between Maine and New Brunswick. Overlapping boundary claims had
created a disputed territory rich in timber but lacking organization.
Troops were mobilized, but war was averted when national leaders in
Washington and London recoiled at the prospect of a third war between
the two nations. The “war” has been dismissed by contemporary ob-
servers and historians alike because of the lack of shots fired. What has
largely been overlooked, however, is the large body of political rhetoric
churned out by Maine’s Democrats and Whigs during the dispute. In ex-
amining this rhetoric, themes of honor, rights, and obligation emerge.
While the war drums eventually faded, this rhetoric contributed to a
new self-identity in Maine. A “phenomenalized” (or imagined) geogra-
phy of the state emerged, in which residents of the young state were able
to project their values and ambitions upon the undeveloped disputed ter-
ritory. The author is a Ph.D. candidate in Canadian-American History
at the University of Maine and a recipient of the University of Maine
Canadian-American Center’s New England, Quebec, and Atlantic
Provinces research fellowship. His current research interests include the
northeastern borderlands, identity in nineteenth-century North Amer-
ica, and the employment of rhetoric in early republican politics. He re-
sides in Brewer with his wife, Rebeckah, and daughters Lucy and Clara.
ON FEBRUARY 26, 1839, a peculiar sight in the annals of Maine’shistory “engrossed the general attention” in the state capital.Governor John Fairfield, in office not yet three months, stood
as Maine’s “commander in chief,” reviewing two columns of troops pass-
ing before him. In two days, these militiamen would be making their
way into a frozen strip of disputed forestland, fully expecting to spill the
blood of New Brunswick’s soldiers, who fought for the most formidable
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empire on the planet. In two months, they would be back on their
homesteads, preoccupations with honor and ambitions of glory re-
placed by the rhythm of another Maine planting season. Throngs of ex-
cited men, women, and children looked on as the soldiers formed “into a
hallow square,” faced the governor, and listened as he began his address:
Fellow soldiers: It is with feelings of the utmost satisfaction and pride,
that I witness the promptitude with which you have responded to the
call of your State, and taken up arms in her defense. This is no ordi-
nary crisis. The time has arrived when ye must stand up boldly as men,
as patriots, or meanly crouch with the servility of slaves. The time has
arrived when we must make a vigorous and manly defense of our soil,
or ignobly permit it to be wrested from us by a foreign power. At such
an alternative can a freeman hesitate? No– is the responsive and simul-
taneous shout of this whole people. That spirit of patriotism which
lighted up the fires of the Revolution, glows in the bosoms of our citi-
zens with undiminished force. May it never be extinguished while we
have rights to contend for, or aggression to oppose.1
Nearly two centuries removed, it seems entirely out of place that a state
governor would be raising an armed force and sending it into a “crisis”
to face a foreign foe. It is more peculiar still that a relatively small state at
the northeastern edge of the country would be the one mustering its
troops. 
In February 1839, however, Maine found itself at the climax of a ter-
ritorial dispute with Great Britain and the British colony of New
Brunswick. Militia activation, political posturing, and diplomatic pro-
ceedings sent officials and opinion-makers into a frenzy of rhetoric and
debate that captivated not only the adolescent state of Maine but the en-
tire North American continent.2 A multitude of interests within Maine
began a simultaneous push for war with Great Britain over what General
Winfield Scott, who helped mediate the conflict, called, “a strip of land
lying between two acknowledged boundaries, without any immediate
value except for the fine ship-timber in which it abounded.”3 While
Scott may have been correct in the literal value of the land in question,
clearly to Governor Fairfield, the militiamen, and the enthusiastic
crowd, the strip of land in question was a sum greater than its individual
pine trees and pastures. The Aroostook War is today a footnote of his-
tory, but in February 1839, far more was at stake.
Despite General Scott’s dismissive comment, in the minds of Main-
ers there was more than simply an economic value to the disputed terri-
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tory in the northeastern borderlands. In fact, officials and opinion-mak-
ers in Maine used war rhetoric to manufacture a new “phenomenalized”
(or imagined) geography in the young state. All of the talk about the dis-
puted territory created an imagined form, one which did not map out
trees and rivers but instead “mapped out” elements of identity and am-
bition in the state and projected them metaphorically onto the physical
thing of the land. To take the land, therefore, was to grab hold of one’s
masculinity, display one’s patriotism, and legitimate Maine as a state. Al-
though historians have typically sought to reduce the Aroostook War to
the simplest terms possible, the decades between statehood and the Civil
War in Maine were a time in which the notions of being an “American,”
a “Mainer,” and an honorable individual were interwoven. Politicized
newspaper accounts and official public statements from the Aroostook
War offer a point of entry into how Mainers conceptualized their
“standing” in the world, in terms of both physical and societal space. As
such, examining the rhetoric of the Aroostook War – the words em-
ployed by officials and opinion-makers to yield an audience’s acquies-
cence to a specific agenda – can help to “map out” a model of spatial
identity in 1830s Maine that is more complex than most of the existing
historiography allows.
For six weeks in the winter of 1839 a long-simmering boundary dis-
pute on the northeastern frontier of the United States came to a boil.
Contradictory understandings of the location of the “highlands” and the
identity of the “St. Croix River” in the Treaty of Paris (1783), which
ended the American Revolutionary War, created a mass of territory to
the northeast of Maine and the west of New Brunswick that was claimed
and administrated by both sides.4 The American state and British colony
had become fed up with the attempts by the other to regulate lumbering
in the disputed territory, and when a Maine land agent was arrested and
sent to a New Brunswick prison, war seemed inevitable.
Enthusiasm for the mobilization of Maine’s militia to defend the dis-
puted territory was widespread. On March 8, the Portland Advertiser de-
clared that “the pomp and circumstance of glorious war has been en-
acted in every street.”5 This excitement was both a product of and an
impetus for bold rhetoric from Maine’s leaders. As Maine and New
Brunswick organized “posses” to defend hastily built defenses in the
sparsely populated forestland of the northeastern borderlands, the
United States and Great Britain begrudgingly prepared for war as well.6
Fortunately, more ink was spilled than blood, and soon after the arrival
of “Old Fuss and Feathers” (the aforementioned General Scott), Maine
Aroostook War 
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“Map of the Northern Part of the State of Maine and of the adjacent British
Provinces,” which shows the overlapping claims of New Brunswick and Maine
to the Aroostook territory. From Henry S. Burrage, Maine in the Northeastern
Boundary Controversy (Portland, ME: State of Maine, 1919), opposite p. 170.  
and New Brunswick reached a truce. Three years later, in 1842, the Web-
ster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and Great Britain set-
tled the border between the United States and Canada, establishing the
boundary much as it rests today.
When examining the Aroostook War, several questions emerge.
What confluence of political, cultural, and economic conditions would
lead the state of Maine towards war in 1839? How does one account for
the bold words employed by Governor Fairfield? What was the signifi-
cance of the disputed territory in the minds of the people of Maine?
More generally, how can rhetoric be examined to better understand the
identity of both speaker and audience? Before exploring these questions,
a frame of reference is needed in understanding the history already writ-
ten on the Aroostook War.
As alluded to above, oversimplification has been a hallmark of the
historiography on the Aroostook War. With a few notable exceptions,
past study on the dispute has been an exercise in forcing historical events
into a preexisting mold, glossing over contradiction, and truncating lay-
ers of complexity. There are two separate schools of historians that have
partaken in this practice. The first, and perhaps most common, is repre-
sented in the tomes of diplomatic history.7 In the longue durée of Amer-
ican diplomacy and armed with national myth, the bloodless dispute is
handled with varying degrees of indifference and disinterest. Parsing the
words used in these volumes makes for an interesting study of periph-
eral neglect in histories of the center, but they contribute little to under-
standing the actual events of the dispute from a level of narrative beyond
national metahistory.
The most valuable of these diplomatic studies are those that specifi-
cally focus on Anglo-American relations. Many of these works place the
Aroostook War within a series of border tensions leading up to the 1842
Webster-Ashburton Treaty.8 Unfortunately, more detail does not pro-
vide a greater understanding of the hearts and minds of those immedi-
ately involved in the dispute. On the contrary, Mainers and New
Brunswickers are often treated as “belligerent,” simple-minded “hot-
heads…[who] kicked the dogs of war” and needed proper “statesmen”
to prevent them from killing one another.9 Although not defensible, ac-
quiescing to the easy narrative of a shortsighted local spat being settled
by level-headed national diplomats is perhaps understandable given the
methodological choices made in the above studies. Their documentary
support is derived almost entirely from official national sources and, of
those, international correspondence and treaties are emphasized.
Aroostook War 
This approach has very real advantages for the historian looking to
briefly illustrate the close relationship of the United States, Canada, and
Great Britain over an expansive chronological space. It also narrows
their study’s focus down to those forces that had the biggest direct in-
volvement on the boundary’s final demarcation. Yet, relying solely on
national-level sources has led diplomatic historians to gaze out upon the
periphery from an unsympathetic metropole. A teleological sense of the
northeastern boundary dispute is the result, informed more by the com-
ing Webster-Ashburton Treaty and other Anglo-American border crises
than the actual events that transpired in Maine and New Brunswick. Un-
der these conditions, it is easy to disregard the concerns of borderlands
inhabitants and indifferently bemoan how “the diplomatic dispute be-
came exposed to the hazards of local rivalries, local politics, local per-
sonalities.”10
On the other hand, historians crafting local histories about the
Aroostook War as part of works on Maine or New Brunswick represent a
second school of oversimplification.11 As a large number of these studies
have been penned by amateur historians, the body of literature reflects
scholarly trends less than do the aforementioned works of diplomatic
and political history. Instead, they form narratives largely from recollec-
tion, oral tradition, literal readings of sensationalist local newspapers,
and the accounts of fellow amateur historians, an approach conducive to
histories that seek to justify the actions or exaggerate the honor of local
agents. The act of defending the periphery’s role in the dispute comes in
several forms, whether seeking to emphasize the value of the disputed
territory, or characterizing local officials as single-handedly defending
the nation’s honor while “the politicians dipped their diplomatic fingers
into the brew” and “the diplomats dawdled along in a half-hearted man-
ner.”12 This bias carries with it the often implicit intention of pushing
back against the marginalization of the periphery perceived in the ac-
tions of the metropole and the words of those who have written metro-
centric history, a tonic for the disaffected population of a forgotten pe-
ripheral state. 13
There are scattered examples of studies that have begun to bridge the
gap between meta- and micro-historical methodologies. One historio-
graphical tradition that has been applied to the Aroostook War to great
effect is that of environmental history. As a principal concern of Mainers
and New Brunswickers was access to valuable timber, those writing his-
tories of resource extraction and lumbering have sometimes dealt with
the boundary dispute.14 Analyzing the dispute through the lens of tim-
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ber interests lends itself well to a transnational perspective of events, as
economic interests frequently ignore national demarcations when profit
is at stake. Richard Judd’s chapter on “The Aroostook War and its After-
math,” from Aroostook: A Century of Logging is perhaps the strongest ex-
ample of this approach, successfully illustrating the specific concerns of
individual residents of the area while not losing sight of the greater
forces of national interest at play.15 Judd’s significant contribution to the
historiography of the boundary dispute is his ability to avoid both the
warped telescope of survey-writing historians and the (often unin-
tended) microscopy of personal investment evident in local history, un-
covering a complexity that other studies fail to unearth:
At the local level this complicated disturbance involved state and
provincial officials attempting to save an important source of govern-
ment revenue, settlers of mixed nationality defending their allegiances
to rival governments, lumbermen from Maine and New Brunswick
struggling to free their season’s cut of logs from the jurisdictional
snarls of three competing land agencies, and finally trespassers, rang-
ing from settlers hoping to get out a few sticks of pine to operators log-
ging for some of the largest firms on the East Coast. National alle-
giances blur in this complex mixture of conflict and cooperation.16
This passage accomplishes a dimension of complexity and contingency
not found in many of the aforementioned works. Judd avoids construct-
ing rigid dichotomous relationships to force upon the narrative – the
United States v. Great Britain, Maine v. New Brunswick, state v. nation,
local passions v. national reason/importance, “professional politicians”
v. an “amateur” governor – and instead gives a careful reading to how in-
dividual actors experienced the dispute from an array of perspectives
and allegiances.17 For any given actor, the “blur” of allegiance and “com-
plex mixture of conflict and cooperation” amounts to the building
blocks of identity.
Spatial identity in all its forms is an historical phenomenon that can-
not be entirely separated from individual subconscious, nor can it be
broken down into separate or non-contradictory pieces.18 At the same
time, identity is a key consideration to make in fully accounting for the
actions and ambitions of historical actors. How, then, does one go about
understanding more about the identity of Maine’s inhabitants during
the Aroostook War? With few primary sources that display the private
thoughts of Maine residents themselves, a careful approach to public
rhetoric, such as Governor Fairfield’s aforementioned address, can pro-
vide a vital point of entry. These sources have been heavily utilized by
Aroostook War 
historians and the merit of their words taken for granted by some and
summarily dismissed by others, but under a more careful analysis, rhet-
oric can yield more than a politically motivated version of the Aroost-
ook War’s basic narrative.19
Historian Kristen J. Hoganson has argued that scholars should take
public rhetoric seriously, “treating it as something that illuminates moti-
vations, convictions, and calculations of what is politically efficacious.”20
Although Hoganson examined public rhetoric during the Spanish-
American War, her methodology is applicable to the question at hand.
Identifying the rhetorical themes deemed “politically efficacious” in the
case of the Aroostook War allows one to consider what these calcula-
tions of efficacy say about how residents of Maine crafted their spatial
identity in the 1830s.21
The above consideration is not designed to give rhetorical verbiage a
free pass; it is undeniable that politicians and the media should often be
taken at less than face value. As such, rhetoric should not be used as a
perfect reflection of the personality or ideology of the speaker; nor
should it be mistaken as a complete reflection of an audience. Rhetoric is
best used as an illustration of the ideas that the speaker (or author) be-
lieved would carry meaning for his audience significant enough to yield
their acquiescence to the speaker’s agenda/goals, although filtered
through the personality of the speaker and the limited nature of lan-
guage. At the same time, rhetoric should not be dismissed as “empty.” In
his discussion of rhetorical “keywords” and their history in American
political parlance, historian Daniel T. Rodgers reasons, “clearly political
words do more than mystify. . . . Words make mass actions possible.
With words ringing in their heads, masses of men have made revolutions
and crusades, flung themselves into war, savaged other human beings
who refused to give up some contrary form of talk.”22
Crafting words to move men to war for land over which it had never
clearly exerted control, Governor Fairfield’s speech on February 26,
1839, was designed to motivate in precisely this manner. After the open-
ing of this speech, quoted above, Fairfield turned to recount the events
that led to his call to arms:
Fellow soldiers— An unfounded, unjust and insulting claim of title has
been made by the British Government, to more than one third of the
whole territory of your State....in the meantime, its subjects are strip-
ping this territory of its valuable growth of timber, in defiance of 
your authority and power. A few days since you sent a civil force, 
under your Land Agent. . . [who was] seized, transported beyond the
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bounds of the State, and incarcerated in a Foreign Jail under British 
authority. . . . And perhaps before this moment, your soil has been not
only polluted by the invaders’ footsteps, but the blood of our citizens
may have been shed by British myrmidons.23
Those who gathered for Governor Fairfield’s message would not
have been hearing such language for the first time. Boundary controver-
sies had been a fact of life in Maine for decades and had reached a boil-
ing point a few weeks prior with the arrest of “your Land Agent.” In early
February, “an armed posse” led by land agent Rufus McIntire, had been
sent by the Maine legislature for “driving out or arresting the trespassers,
and preserving and protecting the timber from their depredations.”24
The mission was made in response to a report that $100,000 worth of
timber had been taken out of Maine-claimed forests by New Brunswick
lumbermen in the previous year.25 After an exhausting trek northward,
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Rufus McIntire, a state land agent, led an armed posse of approximately two
hundred Mainers to the disputed territory in February 1839. His capture and
arrest by New Brunswick authorities helped spark the Aroostook War and was
used as part of the heated debate by the partisan press in Maine over the mobi-
lization process. From John Francis Sprague, The North Eastern Boundary Con-
troversy and the Aroostook War (Dover, ME: The Observer Press, 1910), oppo-
site p. 60. 
McIntire, who had aged considerably since his enthusiastic service in the
War of 1812, accepted the hospitality of a local settler who offered him a
warm bed for the night.26 McIntire’s host was less than gracious: in a set-
up, the house was surrounded by hostile provincial lumbermen. The
fifty-four-year-old was placed under arrest and imprisoned in Frederic-
ton for invading British lands.27
As Rufus McIntire was an appointee of the majority Democratic
Party, it is no surprise that the Bangor Whig and Courier, one of the mi-
nority Whig Party’s major press outlets, ridiculed the land agent by pub-
lishing a satirical poem: “Run, Strickland, run! / Fire, Stover, fire! / Were
the last words of McIntyre.”28 Democratic newspapers were outraged.
The Eastern Argus, for example, called for “public scorn [on] those
prints, which, like the Bangor Whig and Portland Gazette, are shameful
enough to ridicule the proceedings of their own government, and exult
over the seizure of its citizens.”29 Two days previous, the Bangor Whig
and Courier had already justified its use of satire:
When we first heard of the capture of the Land Agent and several 
others, and the sudden retreat of the Sheriff with his posse, we sup-
posed . . . that the prisoners would be released after a short detention
and that this whole manner and the way it had been conducted and
terminated was a fair subject of ridicule. . . . It was the proper subject
of game, which anyone had a right to hunt down.30
The Whig and Courier continued, claiming that, although the Whigs
“stand ready to shoulder our musket and take our chance in the front
rank of militia...to defend the territory purchased by the blood of our fa-
thers,” they had the “right to demand wise counselors” led the Aroostook
expedition rather than “such weak, inefficient, and feather-bed men as
have recently been shoved forward.”31 For good measure, the editorial
suggests that recently ousted Governor Edward Kent, a Whig, would
have had “little or no trouble in driving off the trespassers.”32 The McIn-
tire affair inspired multiple jabs back and forth between newspapers be-
fore the Bangor Whig and Courier eventually relented: “We have no time
to waste now in answering the attacks of the Argus and other...papers.
They may bring false accusations against the Whigs now as did the To-
ries of the Revolution; our acts will be a sufficient defense for us. We are
ready and ever have been to join heart and hand in all measures of Gov.
Fairfield tending to protect the honor and rights of our State.”33
Given the nature of the press in the nineteenth century, this sort of
back-and-forth between newspapers run by rival political parties is cer-
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tainly not surprising. War rhetoric may not have been so radical, how-
ever, nor have played so significant a role in the Aroostook War had
Maine not been such fertile ground for its use. Its own state (separate
from Massachusetts) for less than two decades, Maine represented an
open battleground for the second party system, which had begun in the
1820s as a rivalry between Andrew Jackson’s populist Democratic Party
and Henry Clay’s upstart Whig Party, usually supported by fewer but
wealthier Americans.34 According to historian Richard P. McCormick,
by the 1830s, Maine was “in the throes of political reorganization.”35
“The politics in Maine was more popular, less sedate, than in Massachu-
setts,” McCormick notes, and Maine’s Whigs and Democrats were early
examples of large-scale party organization and high voter turnout in the
United States.36
Because of political realignment and the state constitution’s creation
of one-year gubernatorial terms, election-year radicalization was an
eternal reality in the state. Maine also possessed an abundant and active
body of printers ready to disseminate party materials. Maine’s creeping
frontier and abundant amounts of newly settled land ensured there was
a steady stream of new markets for aspiring printers to try their hand at
print media, and “party organs had sprung up in the new territory.”37
Inheriting the print culture of its former state capital, Maine saw “sons
and apprentices of Massachusetts printers, especially from Boston, had
left their cases and... had founded papers in Vermont and Maine.”38 The
Bangor Whig and Courier, for example, was created in 1833, within nine
months of the official organization of the Whig Party itself; by July the
following year, it was printing daily.39 In 1835, Portland alone boasted
more daily papers than the entire island of Britannia outside of Lon-
don.40 By July 1, 1839, Maine boasted more newspapers and periodicals
than Connecticut, New Jersey, or Washington, D.C.41 Maine was a con-
tested political space, and this encouraged the partisan press culture of
the nineteenth century to spring into action, jockeying to create a
foothold in the new state. As an open frontier space connected to the
booming Boston print industry, Maine offered plenty of new outlets for
excited party rhetoricians to use to their advantage.
Although each party’s printers sniped back and forth on a variety of
issues, the papers in Maine largely did not disagree with one another on
the question of war. Although at odds with the Eastern Argus, a Demo-
cratic newspaper in Portland, the Bangor Whig and Courier was clear in
its support of the Aroostook expedition and even claimed its willingness
to stand “in the front rank of militia.”42 With few exceptions, Demo-
Aroostook War 
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By the late 1830s, Mainers had already developed a strong metaphorical sense of
the disputed territory, but in some cases knew little else about it, as this short ar-
ticle makes clear. Bangor Whig and Courier, February 28, 1839.  
cratic and Whig papers shared both their support for Maine’s land
claims and the rhetorical strategies employed to encourage the same
stance amongst their readership. From Canada, the Montreal Aurora
marveled: “Whigs and Democrats, so opposed on almost all other ques-
tions, think alike upon this, and demand war with equal enthusiasm.”43
A Boston newspaper agreed: “both of the political parties unite hand
and heart on the subject, and seem to vie with each other to sustain their
executive.”44
In reality, it was precisely because of the divisive quality of party pol-
itics in Maine that both sides ran hard-line rhetoric in favor of the
Aroostook expedition. Historian David Lowenthal reasons that “the
Whigs had offered to bury the hatchet, to act the part of true patriots”
because of the prevailing attitude that any party painted as anti-Maine
in its stance on war would pay heavy political dividends.45 The New York
Gazette predicted that “nine-tenths of the democracy of numbers would
go for a war – a general war. . . . To belong to, or have any sympathy with,
the ‘Peace Party’, will ruin a man unto his third or fourth generation.”46
This concern would be particularly pressing for both parties since gu-
bernatorial elections were held yearly, making election-year posturing a
constant occupation. Further, state politics were impossibly tight: the
Whigs and Democrats were so evenly matched in Maine that in 1840, for
example, Governor Fairfield lost his bid for reelection by 0.074% of the
state electorate.47 Neither party could afford to be left behind in the
march to war, thus relegating their disagreements to sidebar jabs over
proper strategy and leadership qualities. General Winfield Scott wrote,
“the popular cry being for war, the Whigs were unwilling to abandon
that hobby-horse entirely; but the Democrats were the first in the saddle
and rode furiously.”48  Maine’s numerous politically charged newspapers
were thus nearly identical in their rhetorical stance over the question of
war.
Reviewing the body of press literature and the posture employed by
state officials, there are three interrelated leit-motifs to consider from the
war rhetoric of 1839. The first is that of honor. In the nineteenth-cen-
tury Western world, historian Kristen J. Hoganson notes, “assertions that
men from various walks of life valued honor as a standard for individual
and national behavior made it clear that a man who denied that honor
was at stake or who hesitated to defend it would no longer represent 
[it] . . . [some argued that honor] should transcend ideological differ-
ences and unite all men.”49 This mantra was clearly visible in the rheto-
ric during the Aroostook War.
Aroostook War 
Many Mainers believed that honor – of the nation, state, and indi-
vidual – was at stake in a boundary dispute with Great Britain, and it was
up to each Mainer to defend that honor. This sense of honor was often
connected with patriotism and the American Revolution. In his speech
to the assembled militiamen, Governor Fairfield spoke of the “spirit of
patriotism which lighted up the fires of the Revolution, glows in the bos-
oms of our citizens with undiminished force.” In a letter to his son, Fair-
field argued, “Now, although it is wicked to fight under most circum-
stances, it is not wicked, in my opinion, to fight for the defense of our
country.”50 Fighting also had the advantage of proving one’s manliness,
imagery used to goad Maine men into militia service, as we see from the
opening section of Governor Fairfield’s address (“stand up boldly as
men, as patriots”) and implicitly in his assertion that Britain was acting
“in defiance of your authority and power.”51
The rhetoric of honor in the McIntire affair was applied not only to
the nation and the individual, but to the state. In the wake of McIntire’s
arrest, the Augusta Journal lamented, “how much longer will the people
of Maine submit to such indignities?” Likewise, the Bangor Whig and
Courier declared, “our State has been for the third time invaded and our
citizens carried away and incarcerated in a FOREIGN JAIL! We now ap-
peal to arms . . . upon this question the whole state is united to a man.”52
Both invocations of honor are designed to appeal to the individual
reader’s sense of belonging to the meaningful demarcation of “Maine.”
What honorable Mainer, after all, could sit at home whilst his state suf-
fered insult, or could dare cower at home as the rest of the state, “united
to a man,” marched off to war? That state honor would be so prevalent in
war rhetoric from this period makes a strong case for the idea of
“Maine” holding a prominent place in the spatial identity of its resi-
dents.
Closely linked to the rhetorical concept of honor was the theme of
rights. That it was dishonorable for Maine and the United States to yield
the disputed territory to Great Britain suggested an innate ownership of
the land, and with it the rights and jurisdiction of a landowner. “Maine
will not falter,” wrote the Augusta Age, “until her rights are established
and her jurisdiction extended to the utmost limits of her territory. And
may God defend the right!”53 The Belfast Republican noted simply:
“Maine and her soil, or BLOOD!”54 A common justification for land
rights came from the rhetorical power of the American Revolution,
claiming the disputed territory as an American spoil of war. Mainers
were urged to rekindle “a little of the spirit of ’76” and “fall back upon. . .
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[the] original sovereignty” gained by the Treaty of Paris.55 Rhetoricians
also invoked the fact that most Mainers could easily trace their family’s
connection to the Revolution. The opening stanza of lyrics published in
the Bangor Whig and Courier read: “Soldiers of Maine, your weapons
prepare, / your frontiers are rising the clouds of grim war, / Your rights
are invaded, invaded your soil, / Which your fathers have purchased with
life, blood and toil.”56
So deep was the sentiment that Maine held an innate right to control
the disputed territory that Governor Fairfield declared to the state legis-
lature, “the object in the first place was to protect public property...you
sent what was deemed a sufficient military force to . . . repel any invasion
of our soil that should be attempted.”57 Taking it a step further, the gov-
ernor addressed the rights of Maine, independent of the nation, to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the disputed territory:
But if it had been otherwise, and the Government of the United States
had agreed that the British Government should have exclusive juris-
diction and possession of this territory, which it acknowledges to be
ours, would it have been binding upon Maine? Clearly not. The re-
spective States of the Union are sovereign and independent, except so
far as that sovereignty has been restrained or modified by the Consti-
tution of the United States. The General Government is one of limited
and defined power. The power to alienate the territory of a State, or to
transfer a portion of it, or the jurisdiction and possession of it, to a
foreign power, for an indefinite period, or for one hour, is no where
granted.58
Here Governor Fairfield was assuming a political position that certainly
would have been espoused by a large number of Democrats in the ante-
bellum era – especially the southern faction.
Yet it is surprising that a governor in New England, a region gener-
ally considered more in favor of strong national authority, espoused a
states’ rights position.59 Fairfield was not the only Mainer raising the
rhetorical banner of states’ rights during the Aroostook War, a sentiment
that was noticed in other parts of the country. The Boston Patriot called
Maine’s stance “an experimental lesson in the science of nullification,”
and the Boston Evening Mercantile Journal demanded, “how like idiots
or madmen people will act in the middle of a war excitement! What
good will this mad movement do the state of Maine?”60
The translation of Maine’s jurisdiction over the disputed territory
into claims of states’ rights in diplomacy and war may seem an extreme
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shift, if not akin to the position of South Carolina nullifiers in the late
1820s and early 1830s, or even southern secessionists in the 1860s. Un-
der further consideration, however, the governor’s message was closer to
a rhetorical device than an actual push for nullification. As historian J.
Chris Arndt points out, “Maine’s reliance on principles of states’ rights
was, above all, reluctant. State leaders acted only when federal officials
refused to do so, and even then, they continued to entreat, or to coerce,
the national government to support their cause.”61 Arndt’s thesis – that
state economic woes created the need for a quick settlement of the land
dispute and thus spurred state officials to press Washington all the
harder – serves as a pivot from the rhetorical invocation of rights over
the land to a third major theme: obligation.
The concept of obligation manifested itself on multiple levels within
the rhetoric of the Aroostook War. In the above case, the issue at hand
was the United States’ obligation to Maine. From the beginning of the
dispute, Maine had darted back and forth between demanding Washing-
ton’s support and rejecting national control over the boundary settle-
ment. State leaders were desirous of the added negotiating (or pure fire)
power of the federal army whilst anxious over how U.S. diplomats
would “settle” on the boundary issue in the name of overall national in-
terest. To wit, as the Portland Advertiser put it: “what would these fault-
finders have us do? – negotiate? We are sick—utterly and completely
sick—of hearing the word. . . . The General Government must sustain
Maine. It has guaranteed to her the possession of her territory and it
must perform the guarantee.”62
President Martin Van Buren was not quick to make good on Maine’s
shouts of federal obligation. Concerns over war with Great Britain were
very real amongst southern plantation owners and northern financial
interests, and the last thing the president wanted was to further test the
factional cracks beginning to grow in the Democratic Party.63 At the
same time, losing Maine and its two senators would be a considerable
blow to the Democrats, something Fairfield endeavored to use to his ad-
vantage. “Maine is democratic to the backbone,” Fairfield wrote to Van
Buren. “Her democracy is ardently attached to yourself. But should you
go against us upon this occasion—or not espouse our cause with
warmth and earnestness and with a true American feeling, God only
knows what the result would be politically.”64 The president tread care-
fully between appeasing Mainers by backing their land claims and pro-
voking Great Britain to war by enforcing them.
It was then, as Maine’s war fervor was at its height and the initial ex-
citement throughout the country began to wane, that the rhetoric con-
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cerning the Aroostook War began to adopt a tinge of peripheral resent-
ment. “If he throws cold water upon us,” wrote one Mainer about Van
Buren, “and treats the subject coolly, and in his non-committal style, he
may bid farewell to the votes of Maine forever.”65 A Boston newspaper
even ranted over the unwillingness of the federal government to come to
Maine’s direct aid: “Maine ought not to withdraw her armed force, and
if the Union will not sustain her rights, she will be justified by patriot-
ism, equity, and common sense, in sustaining them herself.”66 The hope
in Maine of leading the nation into a victorious war turned into a feeling
of betrayal and abandonment, a sentiment that endured even as the ex-
citement of the Aroostook War faded. Maine’s concern about its status as
a neglected peripheral state persisted well into the twentieth century.
These three rhetorical themes – honor, rights, and obligation – also
reverberated in Washington as Maine’s congressional representatives
looked to secure federal support for the state’s boundary claims. The
major debate centered on a bill that would give President Van Buren a
wider scope of powers in relation to the “Maine Boundary Question.”67
On February 27, 1839, the day after Governor Fairfield sent militiamen
on a northward march to the boundary, Senator Reuel Williams, a De-
mocrat, warned that Maine “hopes to obtain her rights peaceably; but be
assured that the delay will soon be regarded as a denial, and then the gal-
lant spirit and perseverance of her sons will accomplish for her what
ages of negotiation have thus far failed to secure.”68 The most impas-
sioned remarks on the floor, however, were made by Representative
George Evans, a Whig, who, in a long speech on the floor of Congress,
demanded:
Will you make no demonstration in behalf of our rights? What can
you then expect but that the most arrogant demands of Great Britain
will be renewed and insisted on? Will you do nothing? Will you leave
Maine to herself? Such is the course already predicted by one of the
British presses in this country. The United States, they say, will aban-
don Maine to the consequences of her own folly. We are now to see
how that is. I have already told you that Maine is in arms, determined
to maintain her rights. She is solemnly pledged on this subject. She
cannot retreat. She will most certainly maintain herself in the position
she has taken. Will you stand by, and see her cut down? Will any man
say that is a result which this nation can witness without disgrace and
dishonor?69
The questions of honor and rights so apparent in the Maine press are
here cast directly upon the nation, framed entirely within the obligation
of the nation to one of its states. 
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With the increasing anxiety in Maine over whether or not Washing-
ton would indeed act on its behalf, Evans gave his fellow congressmen an
image of an unsupported Maine, determined to keep its honor even at
its own peril:
You may see her trod in the dust by military power which she cannot
resist, if you will; you may see her cut off from the Union, and incor-
porated with the colonial possessions of a foreign power; but you will
not see her quailing before the enemy, nor abandoning the high
ground she occupies, while she can lift an arm to uphold her flag.70
It was soon after this debate that President Van Buren sent his resident
boundary arbiter, General Scott, to assuage growing frustrations in
Maine over the executive’s delay and to buy time for a diplomatic solu-
tion. Representative Evans’ comments show there was bipartisan sup-
port for war amongst the Maine delegation and that rhetorical strategies
were shared by state and national officials. In at least one instance, the
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Wooden fortifications in Fort Kent and Fort Fairfield (pictured here) leant their
names to the border settlements in which they were constructed.  Today they
represent one of few physical reminders of the boundary dispute. From Henry
S. Burrage, Maine in the Northeastern Boundary Controversy (Portland, ME:
State of Maine, 1919), opposite p. 262.  
sharing of strategy and information between Washington and Augusta
was deliberate and direct, as Senator Reuel Williams and Governor Fair-
field were in constant contact during the crisis.71
Whether aired in Maine or Washington, each of the three major
rhetorical themes of the Aroostook War, honor, rights, and obligation,
were interrelated, and each can be tied to very real elements of Mainers’
identity in the 1830s. Rhetoric was chosen, as Hoganson states, to be
“politically efficacious.” Officials and opinion-makers drew upon pow-
erful cultural values, a sense of belonging to political parties or to the
state at large, appeals to self-pride, and the allure of glory through manly
conquest. Significantly, each rhetorical device was connected in one way
or another to the disputed territory. Honor had to be gained through the
restoration of the territory’s integrity. Rights had to be asserted through
restored jurisdiction over the territory. Obligations must be fulfilled
through the territory’s defense. Rhetoric “mapped out” the significance
of the northeastern borderlands rather than its physical features. The re-
sult was the development of a phenomenalized geography in which the
disputed territory became a powerful metaphor. Mainers did not sit
down to alter physical maps of their state when confronted with war
rhetoric. Rather, the words they heard and read affected their ephemeral
mental image of their state and more significantly, their understanding
of exactly how they fit into the world around them.
This phenomenalization was manifest in the opening scene in Au-
gusta. The “soil” of the disputed territory was not valued as literal dirt,
but rather as the object of “manly defense” and an opportunity to assert
one’s position as a “freeman.” This was the value that Winfield Scott
failed to ascertain when he marveled at Maine’s enthusiasm for “a strip
of land.” Even the governor’s role was steeped in metaphor. Writing to
his wife the day after his address to the militia, he wrote, “You will per-
haps be surprised to learn that I have turned soldier. . . . I mounted my
horse and acted the Commander-in-Chief.”72 John Fairfield never con-
sidered himself a military commander, but the circumstances of the
Aroostook War made him represent the violent potential of his state’s
land claims.
Unquestionable and universally applicable conclusions about the
past are, of course, impossible to make. Rhetorical verbiage carries with
it inherited meanings of previous generations, and any observation as to
the connection between the above rhetoric and the identity of Mainers
later necessarily carries a measure of post hoc estimation. There is also
the basic truth that, no matter the circumstance (and especially when
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war is in question), there is no perfect “unity of spirit” as events un-
folded. Detractors likely existed even amongst those who cheered on the
governor’s rousing speech, although there is comparatively little record
of the actual experience of the militia. There were rewards offered for
militia deserters, but this fact speaks as much to possible dissatisfaction
upon reaching the front as it does to opposition to the mission on an
ideological level.73 It is quite possible that the colorful exhortations of
newspapers and speeches raised hopes in militia participants that were
not realized in the dull white, greens, and browns of the northern Maine
woods in February. The only widely recorded example of a militia mem-
ber opposing the mission on ideological grounds is that of Reverend
Caleb Bradley, who wrote in his journal: “both our political authorities
are mad—and worse. It seems as though they had combined to ruin our
country. I detest them! I abhor their doings in this respect! O con-
temptible, contemptible, disgraceful, horrible, abominable!”74
Despite Reverend Bradley’s strong feelings in opposition to the
Aroostook expedition, the majority of the evidence suggests that the
rhetoric of the Aroostook War was greatly successful in exciting and
uniting Mainers, serving as both a reflection of identity in Maine in 1839
and a catalyst for its change. Through their bipartisan push for aggres-
sive land claims, officials and opinion-makers reflected the urgency of
Maine’s political and economic climate. In the language and imagery
they chose to espouse, they reflected the values and perceptions deemed
most “real” to their readers. Yet their rhetorical invocation of the dis-
puted territory as a symbol for these values and perceptions also
changed its meaning on an epistemological level, and with it affected the
spatial identity of their audience.
Further, the words these rhetoricians chose to present to audiences
in Maine make it clear that the traditional model of spatial hierarchy –
nation, then region, then locality, each subordinate to and entirely dis-
tinct from the other – was in the case of the Aroostook War an inaccu-
rate generalization.75 The rhetorical themes employed show the applica-
tion of disputed space to the identity of Mainers caused the constant
blending and repositioning of the national with the individual, the state
with the individual, and the national with the state within public dis-
course, resulting in a hybrid form of identity that was distinct from the
prevailing norms of the greater north Atlantic world. The complexity of
the situation in Maine during the Aroostook War belies clear dichoto-
mous pairs to drive a narrative of the war.
On February 26, 1839, Governor John Fairfield closed his remarks
with a benediction:
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This, fellow soldiers, briefly, is the case as now made up. Are you pre-
pared to act upon it? I know you are. I know you will not tamely sub-
mit to such indignities – to such arrogant pretensions– that, you will
not quail under British threats....Go—and carry with you the con-
sciousness that your cause is just, and that the patriot’s blessing will ac-
company you on your way. Go—and may He, who holds the destinies
of nations in his hand, in due time, return you to the bosom of your
families, crowned not only with the laurels of victory but the more en-
during wreath won by DUTY PERFORMED.76
The governor’s wish came half-true. The men indeed returned to their
families, yet the awarding of laurels on either side of the boundary was,
thankfully, unnecessary. Taken at face value, such an outcome makes it
easy to read the Aroostook War as a minor diplomatic incident, the
study of which will provide little. A more nuanced approach, however,
yields a depth of complexity and a wealth of relevant application in the
words of officials and opinion-makers during the winter of 1839. Home
to a fluid boundary for decades, the temporal and physical northeastern
borderlands provide a valuable case study in nineteenth-century spatial
identity.
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